sharpshoot

A keen eye, a steady finger and a willingness to venture into no-man’s land separated the Civil War sharpshooter from the common foot soldier. Equally important, they could emotionally detach themselves from the task at hand, coolly killing not as a unit but as an individual eyeballing through sights a not-so faceless enemy.

While they might call themselves the “squirrel hunters of the war,” they were professional killers, according to Gettysburg guide Gary Kross. On July 2 1863, they proved to be particularly effective.

On a brisk day in March, Kross led a group just shy of two dozen across wind-swept Gettysburg fields to better explain the major impact a minor number of men had on how the three-day battle unfolded.

Although the walk — sponsored by the Civil War Education Association — primarily focused on the 1st and 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters, it started at the Bliss Farm. On the morning of July 2, 1863, six companies of U.S. Sharpshooters occupied the farm located almost midway between the Union and Confederate lines. The Bliss family abandoned the farm the previous day when they saw Rebels moving in west along Seminary Ridge and Yankees east of Emmitsburg Road. When the Union’s 2nd Corps extended its skirmish line to the farm, 250 men from the 1st Delaware replaced the sharpshooters.

Almost as soon as the Delawareans arrived, so did Confederates. The 1st Delaware’s commander, Lt. Col. Edward Harris, “didn’t put up much of a fight,” Kross said. He quickly retreated to the main Union line, leaving his soldiers to extricate themselves as best they could.

Harris later was charged with dereliction of duty and cowardice. Kross quoted what 2nd Corps commander Maj.Gen. Winfield S. Hancock said about Harris: “His instinct to survive negated his duty to command.”

The Confederates settled in the buildings and began picking off Union soldiers in Brig. Gen. Alexander Hays’ division.

Action continued around the barn for most of the day. Pennsylvania troops tried to retake the barn but were repulsed. They “limped back to the Union line.” The 12th New Jersey, called “buck and ballers” by Kross because of the ammunition they carried, had better success.

A buck and ball bullet had three small balls attached to a larger one. Velocity broke the bullet into canister when fired from a smoothbore musket.

“It was an incredibly lethal weapon,” Kross said. The 200 New Jersey men surrounded the buildings and forced the surrender of the 100 Rebels inside. However, control of the barn and buildings seesawed between the opponents, with neither side able to hold without support.

On the morning of July 3, Hancock and Hays decided the issue must be resolved. If Hays continued to throw men into the skirmish he would have a full-scale fight on his hands. Hancock gave Hays permission to fire the buildings if he deemed it necessary. Hays immediately concluded it was necessary and sent the 1st Delaware’s Capt. James Postles of Col. Thomas Smyth’s staff with orders to the Connecticut troops tenuously holding the barn to burn the buildings. They did so after a bit of pillaging of some chickens. That action put a stop to any enemy sharpshooting from the Bliss Farm.

The real significance of the Bliss Farm action, however, was not the casualties caused by sharpshooting. Rather, Kross said, action there diverted Confederate troops from supporting Brig. Gen. Ambrose Wright, who came closest to denting the Union line on July 2.

Skirmishing at Bliss Farm helped disrupt Gen. Robert E. Lee’s overall plan for July 2.

Wright, with the fresh memory of July 2 in mind, would tell artilleryman Col. E. Porter Alexander on July 3 the problem was not reaching the Union line but staying there.

On the Confederate right, U.S. Sharpshooters affected Lee’s plan even more than fighting at the Bliss Farm. Inventor Hiram Berdan, the country’s top marksman, organized the 1st U.S. Sharpshooters at the start of the war. He outfitted them in green jackets and set high standards for applicants. By Gettysburg, all carried .52-caliber Sharps breechloaders. The enemy quickly learned the difference between the Sharps and the regular infantry guns. One Rebel said a sharpshooter’s ball arrived before the report, but with regular infantry, the report arrived first.

Berdan’s personal war record was poor, Kross said. His men claimed he “led from the rear” and took credit for other men’s deeds. In late 1862 unhappy officers filed charges against Berdan. He was cleared in early 1863 but wanted to restore his honor on the field of battle. He found the opportunity to do so at Gettysburg.

“Gettysburg,” Kross said, “was the high point in Berdan’s war career.”

Around 8 a.m. July 2 U.S. Sharpshooters were deployed as skirmishers on the Union left. Their mission: “To feel for the enemy.” Infantry from the 3rd Maine trailed the sharpshooters in line of battle. Imagine a T emerging from the woods, into the Peach Orchard, across Emmitsburg Road and toward modern day West Confederate Avenue and Pitzer Woods.

Meanwhile, Rebels also were on the move. The Confederates wanted to extend its Seminary Ridge line to the right. The two forces collided as Cadmus Wilcox’s men cautiously emerged from Spangler Woods and Berdan’s from Pitzer Woods.

The initial advantage was Berdan’s as two sharpshooter companies, F and I, hit the flank of the 11th Alabama. However, in a most uncharacteristic move, the adrenaline-high sharpshooters shoved aside the need for stealth and cover and chased the Alabamians into an open field. The neighboring 10th Alabama wheeled around and slammed into the outnumbered sharpshooters. The 11th regained its composure and added its firepower to the 10th’s. The Yankee sharpshooters scampered to the safety of Pitzer Woods where they were joined by the 3rd Maine.

Berdan realized he was outnumbered and ordered a fighting withdrawal in what he described as “the finest 20 minutes of the war.”

He later claimed he stopped the forward movement of 30,000 men and while that wasn’t true what transpired in Pitzer Woods was not insignificant.

Berdan sent word to Maj. Gen. Daniel Sickles that his men had encountered heavy numbers of the enemy on the move. Sickles used that information to justify advancing the 3rd Corps from its designated line. That in turn affected the Confederate advance up Emmitsburg Road toward the Union right. It also created a bulge in the Union line, now stretched fearfully thin, that would need support from the 2nd Corps to check disaster.

Once again, the action of a few contributed to upsetting Lee’s plan for July 2. Furthermore, the Pitzer Woods area remained a troublesome spot for the Confederates even after they cleared the woods of Yankees. The Confederates feared Union cavalry would threaten their right flank via the Willoughby Run Valley. With Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry unavailable, the Confederates deployed infantry skirmishers to protect the right flank. That further decreased troops available for the assault on the Union line.

The U.S. Sharpshooters saw more action on July 2 once the Confederate assault on the Union line began in earnest. Lee’s plan called for Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood’s division “to move up Emmitsburg Road” and roll up the Union left toward Cemetery Hill.

From the beginning, however, the plan went awry with Hood taking his line of battle to the right. Furthermore, he had not shared the plan’s objective with his brigade commanders and once he went down seriously wounded they were left on their own to figure out where to hit the enemy. Regiments on the far right aggravated the problem when they angled even farther south and east.

U.S. Sharpshooters deployed to counter the Rebels advancing on the extreme left of the Union 3rd Corps, spreading across the fields, rocks and woods in their ghostlike four-man cells, but also coming together as companies in key spots. Their mission was to harass and delay the enemy.

Kross began the afternoon portion of the walk on Bushman Hill, a rocky knoll backed by Big Round Top. Some 150 sharpshooters used the position to further split the oncoming regiments. Two companies also made a stand behind the stone fences, farmhouse and outbuildings at the Slyder Farm where action was so furious Confederates named it the Hornets Nest.

Again, the outnumbered sharpshooters retreated to a nearby hill to make another stand before pulling back through the woods and rocks. Some headed toward Devil’s Den, stopping along the way at the now rattlesnake-infested Devil’s Kitchen. Others went up Big Round Top and then over to Little Round Top.

After tracking the sharpshooters’ fighting retreat, Kross switched to the Rebel perspective to retrace the 1st Texas’ and 3rd Arkansas’ route to Devil’s Den. Standing in an field off South Confederate Avenue, Kross first pointed north to the Rose Farm and then northeast to Devil’s Den, 660 yards away.

As they marched across the open field, the Rebels came under fire from Smith’s Battery atop Devil’s Den as well as the retreating sharpshooters, he said.

On this day, we circled behind the Slyder Farm and climbed Sharpshooters Hill, recently cleared by the National Park Service.

Standing behind scattered boulders, one could see why the sharpshooters relished the position, with its clear view of the fields — and Confederates — below. Kross said the sharpshooters here probably came under friendly fire from Smith’s guns since this was one of the last spots his gunners could clearly hit the advancing enemy.

Once the sharpshooters pulled back from the hill, the Texans, with the Arkansas boys to their left, moved into the woods south and west of Devil’s Den. Not only did trees now cover the Rebels, but also Smith couldn’t depress his remaining three guns enough as the 1st Texas entered the Triangular Field and made it to a stone wall. Infantry managed to repulse the attack but Confederate support came up making the outcome inevitable as Devil’s Den fell into Rebel hands.